

Engineering Management, Information, and Systems Seminar Series

Research Seminar

Limited-Trust Equilibrium and Social Network Games*



Dr. Rakesh Nagi
Willett Professor in Engineering
Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering,
Affiliate Faculty: ECE, CS, Coordinated Science Lab, Computational Sc. and Eng. University of Illinois at Urbar@hampaign

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Zoom link:https://smu.zoom.us/j/96580795331

easily improve net utility by as much as 14.5%. If only one agent exhibits modest trust among self-centered ones, it can increase its average utility by up to 25% in certain cases! Second, and counter-intuitively, when partnership opportunities are abundant agents become less trustworthy.

Keywords:Game Theory; Limited-Trust; Reciprocity; Long-term interactions; Social Networks; Partner Selection.

*Joint work with Tim Murray, PhD student, and Prof. Jugal Garg, ISE@UIUC

Biography Rakesh Nagi is Donald Biggar Willett Professor of Engineering at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Ch2.3 (i)-5.7 (e)0.002 Tc180pcw.3 (i)-5()]Jm .7 (o)-7 (ng)]J0.308 n

First of Buffalo's "40 under Forty" award (2004), SME's Milton C. Shaw